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Unemployment Insurance: The Washington
Supreme Court and the Labor Dispute
Disqualification
Reacting to the mass unemployment of the 1930's, all states
established unemployment insurance programs to assist eligible
workers through periods of temporary unemployment.' Although
providing relief for a broad spectrum of industrial unemploy-
ment, state unemployment insurance statutes typically contain
various disqualifications rendering otherwise insured workers in-
eligible for benefits.2 This comment discusses a disqualification
common to all state statutes' disqualifying from benefits workers
unemployed because of a labor dispute, and focuses upon the
Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the labor dispute
disqualification in the Washington Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act.4 After discussing the court's approach to the disqualifi-
1. The states enacted unemployment insurance statutes in response to the Social
Security Act of 1935. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396(g) (1970). The Federal Act imposed an unem-
ployment tax upon employers nationwide, but provided for an offset of up to ninety
percent of the federal tax if the employer paid a tax into an approved state fund. The Act
also provided federal grants for the administration of approved state programs. The Act,
however, credited only payments made to state funds before January 1, 1937, against the
federal tax for the previous year. All the states responded quickly to these incentives and
enacted local unemployment insurance statutes within two years of the passage of the
Federal Act. See generally Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insur-
ance in the United States, 8*VAD. L. REv. 181 (1955); Witte, Development of Unemploy-
ment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21 (1945).
2. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § § 50.20.050 (disqualification for voluntary quit); .060
(disqualification for misconduct or felony) (1977 Supp.); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.070
(disqualification for misrepresentation); .080 (disqualification for refusal of suitable work)
(1976).
3. ALA. CODE § 25-4-78 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.380(9) (1972); ARiz. REv. STAT.
§ 23-777 (1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1105(f) (1976); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1262 (West
1972); COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-73-109 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-236 (1977); DEL. CODE
tit. 19, § 3315(4) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.06(4) (West 1966); GA. CODE ANN. §
54.610(d) (Supp. 1977); HAW. REv. STAT. § 383.30(4) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(h)
(Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 434 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §
22-4-15-3(a) (Burns Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.5(4) (West Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-706(d) (Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. § 341.360(1) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:1601(4) (West 1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1193(4) (West Supp. 1977); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6(e) (1969); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, § 25(b) (West 1971);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.29(8) (West Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. § 268.09(3) (Supp.
1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(5) (Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.040(5) (Vernon
1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 87-106(d) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-628(d)
(Supp. 1976); NEv. REv. STAT. § 612.395 (1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 282.4(f) (1975);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(d) (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-9-5(d) (Supp.
1975); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 592(1) (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96.14 (1975); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 52-06-02(4) (1974); OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a) (Page 1973);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 215(e) (West Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 657.200 (1977);
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cation in the context of Washington case law, the comment exam-
ines various policy considerations underlying the labor dispute
disqualification and contrasts the Washington court's interpreta-
tion with the interpretation other state courts have accorded sim-
ilar labor dispute disqualification statutes. Finally, the comment
concludes that the Washington court's singularly narrow inter-
pretation of the labor dispute disqualification results from a basic
misunderstanding of the disqualification's function in unemploy-
ment insurance legislation.
The labor dispute disqualification in the Washington Act
typifies most state statutes:
Labor dispute disqualification. An individual shall be dis-
qualified for benefits for any week with respect to which the
commissioner finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage
of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory,
establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last em-
ployed: Provided, That this section shall not apply if it is shown
to the satisfaction of the commissioner that
(1) he is not participating in or financing or directly interested
in the dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and
(2) he does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which,
immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there
were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage
occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly
interested in the dispute: Provided, That if in any case separate
branches of work which are commonly conducted as separate
businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate de-
partments of the same premises, each such department shall,
for the purposes of this subdivision, be deemed to be a separate
factory, establishment, or other premises.
5
Thus, the provision initially establishes a blanket disqualification
for labor dispute unemployment, but subsequently recognizes a
number of exceptions to disqualification. On a practical level, the
exceptions define the scope of the disqualification, because claim-
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(d) (Purdon 1964); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 28-44-16 (1968); S.C.
CODE § 41-35-120(4) (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 61-6-19 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1324(d) (1977); TEx. REv. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 5221(b)-3(d) (Vernon Supp.
1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(d) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1344(4) (Supp. 1977);
VA. CODE § 60.1-52(b) (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.090 (1976); W.VA. CODE §
21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(10) (West 1974); Wvo. STAT. § 27-26(D)
(Supp. 1977). For a detailed analysis of the provisions of the various state statutes see
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEM-
PLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS 4-41, 42 (rev. 1974).
4. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 50.01.005-.98.080 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
5. Id. § 50.20.090.
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ants remain eligible for benefits upon proof that neither they, nor
a grade or class of workers to which they belong, are financing,
participating, or directly interested in the dispute.
State courts generally have had little difficulty defining and
applying the concepts of "financing"' and "participation"' in the
labor dispute disqualification. The courts are not unanimous,
however, regarding the application of "direct interest" and
"grade or class" to labor dispute unemployment. Nevertheless,
the majority of courts do agree that participation, direct interest,
and grade or class membership constitute distinct disqualifica-
tions under the statutes.8 Only the Washington Supreme Court
rejects this consensus, consistently refusing to recognize a distinc-
tion between the disqualifications for participation and direct
interest Moreover, in a recent decision, the court has equated
the requisites for grade or class membership with actual partici-
pation in the creation of the dispute. 10
Employees of Pacific Maritime Association v. Hut t" provides
the most recent and striking example of the Washington court's
interpretation of "direct interest" and "grade or class" in the
context of the labor dispute disqualification. The unemployment
insurance benefit claimants were longshoremen and foremen
employed by the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA). Although
both longshoremen and foremen bargained with the PMA under
the auspices of the International Longshoremen's and Ware-
6. Contrary to the experience in Great Britain, the mere payment of union dues does
not constitute financing for purposes of disqualification in America. Outboard Marine &
Mfg. Co. v. Gordon, 403 Ill. 523, 87 N.E.2d 610 (1949). Disqualification for financing has
occurred rarely in the United States, prompting one commentator to refer to financing as
"virtually a dead letter issue in the United States." Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and
the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 294, 328 (1949). Twenty states
have eliminated "financing" from the disqualification entirely. See MANPowER ADMINIS-
TRATION, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
LAws 4-41, 42 (rev. 1974).
7. Generally the controversy in the area of "participation" involves a claimant's
failure to cross a striking union's picket lines. The courts almost universally hold that a
voluntary refusal to cross picket lines constitutes participation for purposes of disqualifi-
cation. See, e.g., In re St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wash. 2d 580, 110 P.2d 887
(1941). It has been held, however, that if a legitimate fear of violence or personal harm
inspires the claimant's refusal, he remains eligible for benefits. Blankenship v. Board of
Review, Okla. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 486 P.2d 718 (Okla. 1971).
8. See, e.g., Local 658, Boot & Shoe Worker's Union v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484,
87 N.E.2d 625 (1949); Auker v. Review Bd., Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 117 Ind. App. 489, 71
N.E.2d 629 (1947).
9. See Employees of Pac. Maritime Ass'n v. Hutt, 88 Wash. 2d 426, 562 P.2d 1264
(1977); Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash. 2d 255, 461 P.2d 531 (1969); Wicklund v. Commissioner
of Unemp. Comp., 18 Wash. 2d 206, 138 P.2d 876 (1943).




housemen's Union (ILWU), each negotiated a separate contract
with the PMA. The ILWU-PMA agreement recognized three
classes of longshoremen: class A workers, who were fully regis-
tered ILWU members and had first priority for available work;
class B workers, who were "limited-registered" under the ILWU-
PMA agreement, non-ILWU members, and had a secondary pref-
erence for available work; and casual workers, who were also non-
ILWU members and had no work priority. When their contract
with the PMA expired, a majority of the class A workers author-
ized a strike. Class B workers did not have a voice in the actual
strike vote, but could vote equally with class A workers on
whether to accept the company's final settlement offer.12 In this
respect, the class B workers directly controlled the duration and
final settlement of the dispute, a fact of which the court took little
cognizance. 13 The foremen also took no part in the strike vote.
They traditionally negotiated their contract only after a final
settlement of the longshoremen's agreement, incorporating by
reference various pension and welfare benefits contained in the
former agreement. They too would benefit directly from any man-
agement concessions on these aspects of the longshoremen's con-
tract. Accordingly, the primary issue before the court was the
eligibility of the foremen and class B workers for unemployment
benefits: whether class B workers were directly interested in the
dispute, or belonged to a grade or class of workers any of whom
were participating or directly interested in the dispute.
Although acknowledging that the claimants had a "lucrative
interest"" in the outcome of the dispute, the court held that
foremen and class B workers were not directly interested in the
dispute for purposes of disqualification. The court reached this
conclusion by equating direct interest with actual participation
in the creation of the dispute: "[C]laimants to be ineligible...
must first have some direct input into the creation or mainte-
12. Class B workers did, in fact, participate in a NLRB sponsored vote to determine
whether the employees wished to accept the PMA's final offer. A majority of the employ-
ees rejected the company offer, and the strike continued after the vote. Brief of Appellant
PMA at 5-6, Employees of Pac. Maritime Ass'n v. Hutt, 88 Wash. 2d 426, 562 P.2d 1264
(1977).
13. The court anomalously disposed of this consideration, stating merely that "[tihe
determination of who will be allowed to vote on a final offer is an administrative decision
made by the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to an act of Congress." 88 Wash.
2d at 435, 562 P.2d at 1269. This arbitrary disposition of the issue ignores the fact that
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nance of the dispute."' 5 Solely because the claimants could not
participate in the strike vote they were not "directly interested"
in the dispute. At the very least, the court's interpretation of
direct interest in terms of participation is analytically questiona-
ble, because such an interpretation strips direct interest of any
independent significance for purposes of disqualification and ren-
ders it mere surplusage. The interpretation also contravenes ele-
mentary canons of statutory construction dictating that courts
accord each word in a statute a different meaning, if possible, so
as to render none superfluous."6 Thus, the court's interpretation
is untenable in view of the express statutory language mandating
disqualification for participation or direct interest, 7 which fur-
ther indicates the independent efficacy of each provision.
Hutt accorded little weight to the economic aspects of the
claimants' interest in the dispute. It acknowledged that the
claimants' "wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions were
determined by the results of the negotiations between the striking
rl assl~i Au III A L t4 A )Ng L 14G D I- 1UhI IV .4
substantially the same contract benefits as class A workers, and
that the terms of the foremen's contract derived in part from the
longshoremen's agreement. The court observed, however, that
these contingencies would have occurred "even if there were no
strike."'" Such an observation ignores the crucial facts before the
court: that a strike did occur and that this strike precipitated the
claimants' unemployment. A logical approach to the determina-
tion of "direct interest" must begin with an analysis of the dis-
pute itself and only then proceed to a consideration of the claim-
ants' interest in the dispute. The court's analytical approach,
which begins by hypothesizing the nonexistence of the very sub-
ject in question, actually precludes any valid consideration of the
claimants' relationship to the dispute.
After determining that foremen and class B workers were not
directly interested in the dispute, the court considered and re-
jected the contention that the claimants were members of a grade
or class of workers participating or directly interested in the dis-
pute. To reach this conclusion the court delineated grade or class
membership in terms identical to those employed in resolving the
question of direct interest: participation in the initial strike vote.
15. Id. at 434-35, 562 P.2d at 1269.
16. C.D. SANDS, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973).
17. WASH. REv. CODE § 50.20.090 (1976).
18. 88 Wash. 2d at 434, 562 P.2d at 1269.
19. Id. at 435, 562 P.2d at 1269-70.
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Foremen and class B workers were contractually ineligible to par-
ticipate in the strike vote, and for this reason alone constituted
an independent grade or class of workers. This rationale effec-
tively reduces the grade or class disqualification to a determina-
tion of the actual labor dispute participants and relieves it of any
significance beyond the independent disqualification for partici-
pation in the dispute. In this respect, the same criticisms directed
at the court's interpretation of direct interest apply to its inter-
pretation of the grade or class disqualification. 0 Ultimately then,
under Hutt, participation per se becomes the only ground for
disqualification for unemployment insurance benefits with re-
spect to labor dispute unemployment in Washington.
Hutt's narrow interpretation of the labor dispute disqualifi-
cation did not represent judicial innovation in Washington case
law, but merely extended prior doctrine. In Wicklund v. Commis-
sioner of Unemployment Compensation"' the court similarly had
limited the application of direct interest to actual participation
in the labor dispute. In Wicklund the claimants stood to benefit
from the outcome of a rival union's strike, but because they had
not participated in the dispute, and in fact had opposed it, the
court held the claimants were not directly interested in the dis-
pute for purposes of disqualification. Wicklund also raised the
issue of union jurisdictional disputes. Earlier, in In re Persons
Employed at Deep River Timber Co.,2 1 the court had held claim-
ants, members of one union, "directly interested" in a rival
union's strike, the sole purpose of which was to force a certain
employee to resign his membership in the claimants' union and
join the striking union. The claimants' interest, the court held,
derived from their desire to maintain the status quo with regards
to union membership. In Wicklund, however, which involved a
20. Hutt did not commit itself to a future interpretation of grade or class membership
solely in terms of participation. The court purported to be searching for a flexible interpre-
tation of the provision applicable to any labor dispute. To this end, the court ostensibly
approved Milton Shadur's approach to the issue, that a determination of grade or class
membership depends upon the particular facts of each case. Thus the court stated that
relevant factors might include "similarity in type of work, occupation, conditions of work,
methods or rates of pay, union membership or eligibility therefore, or the employees age-
but only when the dispute itself makes that factor significant." Id. at 435, 562 P.2d at
1270 (quoting Shadur, supra note 6, at 334). Significantly, any of the enumerated criteria
would have placed the Hutt claimants within the scope of the disqualification. Thus, in
view of the court's traditionally narrow interpretation of "direct interest," Hutt's rigid
determination of grade or class membership solely on the basis of participation in the
creation of the dispute takes on an added significance notwithstanding the court's enu-
meration of other possibly relevant criteria.
21. 18 Wash. 2d 206, 138 P.2d 876 (1943).
22. 8 Wash. 2d 179, 111 P.2d 575 (1941).
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similar jurisdictional dispute, the court repudiated this conclu-
sion and declared that direct interest required some element of
actual participation in the labor dispute.
In Ancheta v. Daly23 the court again addressed the question
of direct interest. As in Wicklund, the claimants in Ancheta re-
ceived a wage increase as a result of a strike by another union,
but the court held this fact did not control the determination of
direct interest. 4 Relying on Wicklund, the court concluded that
"direct interest" required actual participation in the dispute, but
significantly, acknowledged both the shortcomings and wide-
spread criticism of such an interpretation.2" Attempting to rein-
force this interpretation, the court formulated an "economic ben-
efit" test which purported to measure the extent of the claim-
ants' economic interest in the dispute. Unfortunately, however,
the court proposed no guidelines for the application of such a test,
but summarily held the wage increase the claimants realized
from th.t strike's outcome did not constitute an economic benefit
when compared with the length of time they were out of work.
Although Ancheta expressly recognized the anomaly of for-
mulating direct interest solely in terms of participation, the
court's proposed solution did little to resolve the problem. The
court ostensibly recognized that direct interest connoted more
than actual participation but refused to disassociate the two con-
cepts entirely. The economic analysis of the claimants' situation
applied only to the extent that it supplemented a determination
of actual participation in the dispute. More significantly, how-
ever, Hutt made no attempt to apply such an economic benefit
23. 77 Wash. 2d 255, 461 P.2d 531 (1969).
24. Throughout Wicklund, Ancheta, and Hutt, the court relied heavily upon a New
Jersey case, Kieckhefer Container Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 125 N.J.L. 52,
12 A.2d 646 (1940), which similarly held direct interest required actual participation in
the dispute. Various courts and commentators have criticized Kieckhefer's interpretation
of direct interest. Brobston v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 94 Ariz. 371, 376, 385 P.2d 239,
242-43 (1963) ([B]y equating 'directly interested' with 'participating' the phrase 'directly
interested' is rendered meaningless."); Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 570, 13 S.E.2d
863, 866 (1941) ([The] decision gives no meaning whatsoever to the expression 'directly
interested in the labor dispute' . . . ."); Poggomoeller v. Industrial Comm'n, Div. of
Emp. Sec., 371 S.W.2d 488, 508 (Mo. App. 1963); Bullitt, Unemployment Compensation
in Labor Disputes, 25 WASH. L. REv. 50, 64-66 (1950); Haggart, Unemployment Compen-
sation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB. L. REv. 668, 684 (1958); Shadur, supra note 6, at
331-32. Furthermore, Kieckhefer constitutes questionable precedent, because a subse-
quent New Jersey case, Gerber v. Board of Review, Div. of Unemp. Sec., 20 N.J. 561, 120
A.2d 436 (1956), limited Kieckhefer to its facts. Gerber held that because the claimants
would benefit from the outcome of the dispute, they were directly interested in the dis-
pute, notwithstanding their lack of participation.




analysis although its application would have disqualified the
claimants in view of their judicially recognized "lucrative inter-
est" in the outcome of the dispute.
27
Throughout Wicklund, Ancheta, and Hutt, the court has
adopted a progressively narrower interpretation of the labor dis-
pute disqualification. Although consistently speaking of direct
interest in terms of participation, the court imparts a more re-
strictive meaning to this concept of participation in Hutt than it
did in the earlier two cases: Wick lund and Ancheta required some
element of participation during the course of the dispute, but
Hutt required that the claimants participate in the actual crea-
tion of the dispute to be disqualified for benefits." Under either
approach, however, the court's interpretation negates the sub-
stantive disqualifications for direct interest and grade or class,
because the analysis of the claimants' relationship to the labor
dispute does not go beyond the consideration of their actual par-
ticipation in the dispute. In the final analysis, the court's narrow
interpretation of the labor dispute disqualification indicates a
fundamental misunderstanding of the disqualification's function
in unemployment insurance. A brief examination of the policy
considerations underlying unemployment insurance legislation in
America will reveal the magnitude of the court's divergence from
the prevailing majority interpretation of the disqualification.
State unemployment insurance programs occupy a unique
position in the framework of social legislation. Unemployment
insurance differs from general public welfare programs because it
does not allocate benefits on the basis of need, but automatically
provides benefits to a specified, insured class of workers for a
limited time.2 The programs' principal objective is to assist the
usually employed worker through the personal crisis of temporary
unemployment °.3 The drafters of the Social Security Act recog-
nized unemployment insurance would not extend complete pro-
tection against the vicissitudes of unemployment; rather, it was
27. 88 Wash. 2d 426, 435, 562 P.2d 1264, 1269.
28. Although the court purported to interpret direct interest in terms of those persons
having some "direct input into the creation or maintenance of the dispute," id., it did
not discuss the claimants' conduct during the course of the dispute, but premised the
decision solely on the claimants' lack of participation in the strike vote. Class B workers
could vote on the PMA's final offer, and therefore did have some "direct input into the
• . . maintenance of the dispute," but the court ignored this factor. See note 12 supra.
29. See Riesenfeld, The Place of Unemployment Insurance Within the Patterns and
Policies of Protection Against Wage Loss, 8 VAND. L. Rv. 218 (1955).
30. For a more detailed analysis of the various objectives of unemployment insurance
see W. HABER & M. MURRAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AMERIcAN ECONOMY (1966).
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to be "the first line of defense for the largest group in our popula-
tion, the industrial worker ordinarily steadily employed."',
Unemployment insurance allocates benefits to individuals
with strong economic ties to the labor market; to be eligible a
worker must be "involuntarily unemployed,"3 and willing to ac-
cept suitable employment.33 Because the program emphasizes
involuntary unemployment, state statutes generally disqualify
claimants who quit their employment without good cause,u who
are fired for job associated misconduct,31 or who refuse an offer
of suitable employment." These disqualifications, premised on
employee fault, encourage stable employment and promote eco-
nomic stability.
Particularly relevant to the disqualifications in unemploy-
ment insurance programs is the fact that unemployment compen-
sation is a type of insurance transfering certain defined risks from
the insured to the insurer. 7 The system protects the insured
worker against a specified risk: involuntary unemployment. In-
surance enterprises cannot insure against losses designedly
caused by the insured.38 Thus, the disqualifications narrow the
classification of the insured event and reduce the programs' scope
to insurable limits.39
American unemployment insurance statutes derive from the
British National Insurance Act,'0 which established the first na-
tional unemployment insurance program." The original purpose
of the British Act lay in protecting workers against "fluctuations
in trade.' 2 The insured unemployment was beyond the control
31. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 13-14 (1935).
32. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (1976).
33. Id. § 50.20.010(3).
34. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 50.20.050 (Supp. 1977).
35. Id. § 50.20.060.
36. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.080 (1976).
37. See W. VANCE, INSURANCE 82 (3d ed. 1951).
38. Id. at 90.
39. See Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REv. 307,
317 (1955).
40. 1 & 2 Geo. V, ch. 55 (1911). See Outboard Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Gordon, 403 Ill.
523, 87 N.E.2d 610 (1949) (discussing the derivation of the American statutes from the
British Act).
41. M. HUGHES, PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING LABOR DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION (1946), pres-
ents an authoritative analysis of the labor dispute disqualification in both the original and
amended British Acts. The author discusses at length the various concepts contained in
the American versions of the labor dispute disqualification.
42. The National Insurance Act was designed primarily to insure workmen
against the loss of employment resulting from "fluctuations in trade" and it was
intended by the trade dispute disqualification to eliminate entirely from cover-
age that unemployment which resulted from a trade dispute, as distinguished
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of the individual worker and resulted from such impersonal
sources as technological developments and natural fluctuations of
the modern industrial economy.43 The original British Act recog-
nized the impersonal nature of the insured unemployment in its
blanket disqualification of otherwise insured workers whose un-
employment resulted from a labor dispute." A subsequent
amendment to the original act allowed a worker to requalify for
benefits upon proof that he was not participating or directly in-
tersted in the dispute, and further that he did not belong to a
grade or class of workers participating or directly interested in the
dispute."
The labor dispute disqualification contained in the amended
British Act, and subsequently adopted in the United States, ac-
cords with the underlying purposes of unemployment insurance.
Labor dispute unemployment is not impersonal in the same sense
as cyclical or technological unemployment. Although not all
workers unemployed because of a labor dispute are "voluntarily
unemployed" in the usual sense of the words, the underlying
sources of the unemployment are qualitatively different from the
sources underlying cyclical or technological unemployment. The
disqualification recognizes the power of the modern industrial
labor movement, which constantly demands improved wages and
working conditions." The disqualification represents the states'
awareness of a fine balance of power between the forces of in-
dustrial management and labor, and indicates the states' desire
to maintain a strict neutrality in labor conflicts. 7
from that unemployment which resulted from fluctuations in trade. In other
words, under the British Act of 1911, if the unemployment resulted from a trade
dispute, it just "was not included in the policy."
Hughes, supra note 41, at 1. Note the similarity between this policy statement of the
disqualification's function in the British Act and the United States Department of Labor's
evaluation of the disqualification's function in American legislation in text accompanying
note 48 infra.
43. See Haggart, supra note 24, at 687.
44. National Insurance Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. V, ch. 55.
45. National Insurance Act, 1924, 14 & 15 Geo. V, ch. 30.
46. It is conceded that unemployment due to a labor dispute may seem
"impersonal" to the individual worker when he has no selfish interest in the
outcome of the dispute; but so long as he realizes economic benefits as a member
of a militant labor movement whose leaders espouse the causes of industrial
strife and class conflict in their dealings with management, he must also accept
the concomitant burdens inherent in the espousal of such causes.
Haggart, supra note 24, at 688.
47. In re Ferrara, 10 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 217 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15, 176 N.E.2d 43, 47 (1961).
Several commentators have attacked this theory on the ground that the disqualification
does not promote true government neutrality, but aligns the government on the side of
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The broad scope of the labor dispute disqualification reflects
the states' desire to maintain a neutral position in labor conflicts.
The disqualification does not focus upon the individual employ-
ment relationship, but upon a class of individuals comprising the
modem industrial labor movement. Thus, the scope of the dis-
qualification is broader than the specific disqualifications for vol-
untarily quitting, termination for job associated misconduct, and
refusal of suitable employment. These latter disqualifications
focus upon individual employee fault; the labor dispute disquali-
fication delineates a general species of unemployment which
stands outside the scope and purposes of unemployment insur-
ance.
Unlike the disqualifications for voluntarily leaving, discharge
for misconduct, and refusal of suitable work, the disqualifica-
tions for unemployment caused by a labor dispute do not in-
volve a question of whether the unemployment is incurred
through fault on the part of the individual worker. Instead they
mark out an area that is excluded from coverage."8
The language of the labor dispute provision indicates the
extent of the disqualification. The statute initially imposes a
blanket disqualification upon claimants unemployed because of
a labor dispute, but relieves the disqualification if the claimants
can prove their detachment from the economic considerations
bearing on the outcome of the dispute. The claimants may prove
themselves detached from the dispute by showing they are nei-
ther financing nor participating in the dispute, but the disqualifi-
cation recognizes that a mere showing of these factors does not
remove the claimants from that complexity of factors involved in
modern industrial labor negotiations. Had the legislatures in-
tended to disqualify only those individuals actively participating
in a dispute, they would have provided disqualification for partic-
ipation and no more. Recognizing, however, that various other
factors exist in the complex area of collective bargaining,49 they
the employer. See Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE
L.J. 167, 175 (1945); Shadur, supra note 6, at 297-98. But see Haggart, supra note 24, at
688; Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primer and Some Problems, 8
VAND. L. REv. 338, 356-58 (1955). The attack on the neutrality theory appears to assume
a great disparity of bargaining power between employers and workers. This assumption
is questionable today, considering the power of modem industrial labor unions.
48. MANPowE ADnINISTRATION, UNrrED STATES DFPT. OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT INsURANcE LAws 4-10 (rev. 1974).
49. For example, employers often pay supervisory personnel a wage based upon a
fixed percentage above the wage paid union workers. Thus, a salary increase for the latter
automatically entails a proportional increase for the former. The foremen's wages in Hutt
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included disqualifications for persons, either personally or
through membership in a grade or class of workers,50 directly
interested in the outcome of the dispute. Apart from the express
language and structure of the labor dispute disqualification, there
exist scant indicia of the legislative intent underlying the disqual-
ification .5 Thus, initially a court may feel somewhat handi-
capped in attempting to ascertain the legislative intent in the
area of labor dispute unemployment. Several inherent character-
istics of the disqualification, however, provide clues which aid in
the interpretation.
Nine states categorically disqualify claimants unemployed
because of a labor dispute.5 1 In the vast majority of states, how-
ever, claimants may avoid disqualification by proving themselves
under an exception; typical exceptions involve the issues of fi-
nancing, participation, direct interest, and grade or class mem-
bership.5 3 Nevertheless, the scope of the disqualification, in spite
of the exceptions, is still quite broad. The disqualification repre-
sents a compromise between two conflicting considerations. The
disqualification initially recognizes that labor dispute unemploy-
ment is beyond the scope of unemployment insurance. The excep-
tions, however, acknowledge that any labor dispute may result in
the unemployment of individuals totally disinterested in and de-
tached from both the outcome and causes of the dispute. As a
practical matter, the exceptions actually define the scope of the
disqualification, and certainly the legislatures could have re-
versed the burden of proof, disqualifying only those individuals
proven to be financing, participating, or directly interested in the
dispute which caused their unemployment. That the statutes ini-
were computed on such a basis. Brief of Appellant PMA at 8, Employees of Pac. Maritime
Ass'n v. Hutt, 88 Wash. 2d 426, 562 P.2d 1264 (1977).
50. Several commentators have recommended abolishing the grade or class disquali-
fication entirely on the ground that a worker who has no personal interest in the outcome
of the dispute should qualify for unemployment insurance benefits. See, e.g., Williams,
supra note 47, at 358-60. So long as the provision remains within the disqualification,
however, the courts must interpret it in accordance with the legislative intent.
51. Under pressure to enact legislation in time to qualify for credits against the
federal unemployment tax, the state legislatures generally modeled their statutes on one
of two draft bills which the Committee on Economic Security had prepared earlier. See
Haggart, supra note 24, at 674. See generally Larson & Murray, supra note 1; Witte, supra
note 1.
52. The states are Alabama, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin. See statutes cited supra note 3. Minnesota claim-
ants who can prove lack of participation in the dispute are eligible for benefits after a one
week disqualification period. After a blanket seven week disqualification, New York
claimants unemployed because of a labor dispute are eligible for benefits.
53. See, e.g., WAsH. REv. CODE § 50.20.090 (1976).
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tially impose a blanket disqualification upon the claimants and
require the claimants prove themselves under an exception sug-
gests that the legislatures intended a strict application of the
disqualification to labor dispute unemployment.
Not only does the structure of the disqualification suggest
the desirability of a strict interpretation, it further intimates the
nature of the inquiry necessary to determine a claimant's eligibil-
ity when unemployment results from a labor dispute. Although
the statutes generally refer to persons "involuntarily unem-
ployed" and unemployed "through no fault of their own," '54 these
concepts of "voluntariness" and "fault" do not apply to the labor
dispute disqualification in the same sense they apply to the indi-
vidual disqualifications in unemployment insurance statutes.
The labor dispute disqualification merely directs the courts to
undertake an objective inquiry into the claimant's relationship to
the labor dispute that precipitated his unemployment. Under this
inquiry it is immaterial that the claimant disagrees with the stri-
kers' demands or desires the cessation of the dispute; the only
consideration is whether the claimant has a tangible, material
interest in the outcome of the dispute because of his economic
relationship with the disputants. Consistently with the policy of
making an objective evaluation of the claimant's relationship to
a labor dispute, the courts have refused to inquire into "fault" in
the context of labor dispute unemployment. To do so would re-
quire that the courts arbitrate the underlying merits of the labor
dispute, and they have repeatedly stated that, absent a statutory
directive, 5 they will not inquire into the merits of a dispute in
determining the applicability of the disqualification."
The Washington Supreme Court never has fully grasped the
nature of the impersonal inquiry into the status of a claimant's
unemployment necessary to a proper application of the labor dis-
pute disqualification. Unfortunately from an analytical stand-
point, the court has never definitively analyzed the concepts of
54. Id. § 50.01.010.
55. Several states do provide for a limited look into the merits of a dispute. Disqualifi-
cation does not result in the following states: Alaska and Arizona, if the dispute exists
because the employer failed to honor an existing labor contract, or if his actions violated
state or federal labor law; Montana, if the employer violated state or federal labor law;
Utah, if the employer violated state or federal labor law, or if he conspired to bring about
the strike; West Virginia, if the employer offered wages substantially less than those
offered to other workers in the locality, denied employees the right of collective bargaining,
or closed his plant to force a change in working conditions. See statutes cited supra note
3.
56. See, e.g., Brown Shoe v. Gordon, 405 Ill. 384, 91 N.E.2d 381 (1950); Bailey v.
Tennessee Dept. of Emp. Sec., 212 Tenn. 422, 370 S.W.2d 492 (1963).
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"direct interest" and "grade or class" and their function within
the labor dispute disqualification, but merely has concluded,
with no underlying justification, that direct interest is limited to
participation in a labor dispute. This anomalous interpretation
may arise from the court's reliance upon unemployment insur-
ance's emphasis on "involuntary unemployment."57 This reli-
ance, however, appears misplaced, because such subjective con-
cepts as "voluntariness," and the related concept "fault," are
inconsistent with the broad, impersonal nature of the labor dis-
pute disqualification.
Although the court has expressly recognized that "fault" has
no application to the labor dispute disqualification," its decisions
belie this assertion. The court's opinions reveal such statements
as: "[The claimants] were not in sympathy with the strike
.... ,,;' "There is no evidence of any labor dispute between the
employer and [claimants].";10 "[Claimants] did not support
the strike and, in fact, actively opposed it.""1 These statements
illustrate the court's continuing reliance upon a fault-based ana-
lytical approach to labor dispute unemployment under which at-
tention focuses primarily on the claimants' personal assessment
of the dispute's underlying merits. The approach ignores the
broader issue of the nature of the claimants' objective, economic
interest in the outcome of the dispute. Hutt, for example, ac-
tually analyzed the claimants' situation as though no labor dis-
pute had occurred," which approach renders the labor dispute
disqualification superfluous.
57. WASH. REv. CODE § 50.01.010 (1976).
58. Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash. 2d 255, 261, 461 P.2d 531, 535 (1969). Subsequently,
in Shell Oil Co. v. Brooks, 88 Wash. 2d 909, 567 P.2d 1132 (1977), the court stated, "[wie
have held the [labor dispute disqualification] applies regardless of the individual em-
ployee's personal involvement in or responsibility for the labor dispute in question.
Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash. 2d 255, 461 P.2d 531 (1969)." Id. at 912, 567 P.2d at 1134.
Significantly, the court did not mention Hutt, in which the employees' "personal .. .
responsibility for the labor dispute," determined by their nonparticipation in the strike
vote, was the controlling factor.
59. Wicklund v. Commissioner of Unemp. Comp., 18 Wash. 2d 206, 220, 138 P.2d 876,
883 (1943).
60. Id. at 215, 138 P.2d at 881.
61. Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash. 2d 255, 263, 461 P.2d 531, 536 (1969).
62. It is true that class B workers receive substantially the same contract
benefits as class A workers, but apparently this would occur even if there were
no strike. The foremen's contracts were renegotiated in light of the new long-
shoremen's and clerks' contract. This renegotiation would occur whether the
longshoremen and clerks reached a new agreement with the PMA after a strike
or otherwise.
88 Wash. 2d at 435, 562 P.2d at 1269-70.
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The court's apparent discomfort with its own analysis and
interpretation of the labor dispute disqualification has not mate-
rially influenced its decisions. Although Ancheta acknowledged
the shortcomings of the "direct interest equals participation"
equation,63 and attempted to supplement this definition with a
watered down "economic analysis" test,64 Hutt marked a return
to, and indeed went beyond, the rigid formalism of the earlier
definition. Fundamentally, such a formulation ignores express
statutory language which disqualifies for participation, direct in-
terest, and grade or class membership respectively. Direct inter-
est logically appears to delineate a broader area than actual par-
ticipation, because workers may be economically interested in the
outcome of a dispute in which they are not participating. 7 Simi-
larly, the disqualification for grade or class membership connotes
more than individual interest, as it goes beyond the issue of ac-
tual personal interest to that of potential interest derived solely
from membership in an amorphous grade or class of workers.
Thus, the court's interpretation poses an elementary puzzle in
semantic analysis which the court presently ignores.
The court's narrow interpretation of grade or class in Hutt is
disturbing, particularly in view of its traditionally narrow inter-
pretation of direct interest. Although Hutt enumerated various
criteria which may be relevant to a determination of grade or
class membership, 8 the court ultimately applied none of them in
resolving the issue, but delineated grade or class membership
solely on the basis of participation in the creation of the dispute.
This narrow interpretation ignores the realities of modern in-
dustrial labor relations. The general justification for the grade or
class disqualification is that it discourages the "key man" type
strike, in which a strike or slowdown by several key employees can
paralyze an entire business enterprise. 9 Accordingly, any test
considering only such rigid classifications as union membership
and a voice in the creation of the dispute will not effectuate this
function, because it ignores the broader economic and employ-
63. 77 Wash. 2d at 264-65, 461 P.2d at 537.
64. Id.
65. Whereas Wicklund and Ancheta spoke in terms of participation during the course
of the dispute, Hutt required participation in the creation of the dispute for disqualifica-
tion. See note 28 supra.
66. WASH. REv. CODE § 50.20.090 (1976).
67. See, e.g., Brobston v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 94 Ariz. 371, 385 P.2d 239
(1963); Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S.E.2d 863 (1941); Senegal v. Lake Charles
Stevedores, Inc., 250 La. 623, 197 So. 2d 648 (1967).
68. See note 20 supra.
69. See, e.g., Cameron v. DeBoard, 230 Or. 411, 370 P.2d 709 (1962).
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ment relationships existing between a small class of strikers and
a potentially greater number of nonunion co-workers. The great
majority of state courts have rejected the Washington Supreme
Court's narrow approach to grade or class membership because
it ignores a number of other relevant factors.
The majority of courts accept the proposition that union
membership is relevant to the determination of grade or class
membership, but recognize the analysis must go beyond this sin-
gle consideration. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Board of Appeals,
70
the Maryland Court of Appeals delineated grade or class mem-
bership on the basis of whether the claimants belonged to the
same bargaining unit, worked under the same contract, and
worked in the same continuous manufacturing process as the
labor dispute participants. Similarly, in Westinghouse Electric
Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review," the
Pennsylvania Superior Court determined grade or class member-
ship on the basis of eligibility for union membership and similar-
ity of work. Admittedly, such interpretations do not provide a
strict formula for determining grade or class membership, but
they do impart a distinct meaning to the disqualification beyond
actual participation in the dispute. For that matter, a court
should not attempt to formulate a rigid set of criteria to govern
the application of the grade or class disqualification, but merely
should identify a number of factors distinguishing the provision
as an independent disqualification.
Cameron v. DeBoard12 represents perhaps the most reasoned
and extensive discussion of the grade or class disqualification.
After surveying the various tests courts have applied in attempt-
ing to define the disqualification, the Oregon Supreme Court con-
cluded that no single test could govern all labor dispute situa-
tions. Although union membership is relevant, the analysis can-
not stop there. The court concluded, however, that a careful anal-
ysis of two further concepts would insure a fair application of the
disqualification: the degree to which both an integration of work
and a community of interest existed between the claimants and
the labor dispute participants. These concepts would allow the
court to look beyond mere union membership and analyze the
realities of the relationship between the claimants and the
strikers. Through such a balanced and comprehensive approach
70. 216 Md. 146, 148 A.2d 403 (1959).
71. 165 Pa. Super. Ct. 385, 68 A.2d 393 (1949).
72. 230 Or. 411, 370 P.2d 709 (1962).
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the grade or class disqualification fulfills its true function within
the labor dispute disqualification.73
Compared to Cameron's comprehensive approach, Hutt's
rigid resolution of grade or class membership solely on the basis
of the right to participate in the strike vote appears singularly
inadequate. Although Hutt indicated a willingness to adopt a
more flexible approach to the determination of grade or class
membership,7' its result does not support this declaration. The
court could insure an equitable interpretation of the provision by
adopting the approach of Cameron which formulates only general
outlines to the composition of grade or class membership, but
which adapts itself to a wide variety of labor dispute situations.
The court, however, could also reaffirm an interpretation of grade
or class based upon the criteria which Hutt merely suggested.
Either approach would effect an interpretation of grade or class
consistent with its legislative purpose, and repudiate the present
anomalous interpretation of grade or class in terms of participa-
tion in the dispute.
The majority of courts also reject Hutt's interpretation of
direct interest in terms of participation and a voice in the creation
of the dispute on the ground that this interpretation renders the
direct interest disqualification superfluous.75 In Auker v. Director
of the Division of Employment Security,"6 the claimants were not
union members and did not vote for, finance, or participate in the
dispute. The Indiana Court of Appeals, however, held that partic-
ipation and direct interest were mutually independent disqualifi-
cations. Because the outcome of the dispute would affect the
claimants' wages and working conditions, the court disqualified
them for benefits on the ground they were directly interested in
the dispute. A Florida Disrict Court of Appeals, in Olusczak v.
Florida Industrial Commission,77 also held that a determination
73. Colorado expressly adopted Cameron's approach to the determination of grade
or class membership in F.R. Orr Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 33 Colo. App. 326,
332, 522 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1974), aff'd 188 Colo. 173, 182, 534 P.2d 785, 790 (1975).
74. See note 20 -supra.
75. See, e.g., Brobston v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 94 Ariz. 371, 376, 385 P.2d 239,
242-43 (1963) ("[Bly equating 'directly interested' with 'participatNG' the phrase
'directly interested' is rendered meaningless."); Burak v. American Smelting & Refining
Co., 134 Colo. 255, 302 P.2d 182 (1956); Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 570, 13 S.E.2d
863, 866 (1941) ("[TIhe distinction gives no meaning whatsoever to the expression
'directly interested in the labor dispute' .... "); Wheeler v. Director of the Div. of Emp.
Sec., 347 Mass. 730, 200 N.E.2d 272 (1964); Nobes v. Michigan Unemp. Comp. Comm'n,
313 Mich. 472, 21 N.W.2d 820 (1946).
76. 117 Ind. App. 486, 71 N.E.2d 629 (1947).
77. 230 So. 2d 31 (1970).
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of direct interest derived from the relationship between the claim-
ants' wages, hours, and working conditions and the outcome of
the dispute. That the claimants were not union members, had no
choice in the decision to accept the employer's offer of settlement,
and, in fact, would have accepted the employer's offer did not
govern the determination of direct interest. Courts have often
cited the formulation of the criteria for determining direct inter-
est set forth in Martineau v. Director of the Division of Unem-
ployment Security.7 In Martineau the claimant was not a mem-
ber of the union conducting the strike. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Court nonetheless held him directly interested in the dis-
pute for purposes of disqualification. The test for determining
direct interest was whether the outcome of the dispute would
affect the claimant's wages, hours, or conditions of employment.
The majority of courts accept the Martineau formulation of direct
interest, which ties the determination of direct interest to the
claimant's economic interest in the outcome of the dispute. 9
Senegal v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc.'* presents a unique
example of how courts in other jurisdictions have dealt with fact
situations identical to Hutt. The claimant, Senegal, became un-
employed because of a labor dispute between his employer, Lake
Charles Stevedores, Inc., and the International Longshoremen's
Union. Senegal typified the situation of the class B workers in
Hutt; he was not a union member, but the agreement between the
union and his employer completely governed his wages and work-
ing conditions. The Division of Employment Security rejected his
application for benefits, but the Louisiana Court of Appeals re-
versed,8' holding, identically to Hutt, that because Senegal had
not participated in the strike vote, he was not "interested' 's2 in
the labor dispute. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this
conclusion:
78. 329 Mass. 44, 106 N.E.2d 420 (1952).
79. See, e.g., Brobston v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 94 Ariz. 371, 385 P.2d 239
(1963); Burak v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 134 Colo. 255, 302 P.2d 182 (1956);
Wheeler v. Director of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 347 Mass. 730, 200 N.E.2d 272 (1964); Nobes
v. Michigan Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 313 Mich. 472, 21 N.W.2d 820 (1946).
80. 250 La. 623, 197 So. 2d 648 (1967).
81. Senegal v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 188 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 1966), rev'd,
250 La. 623, 197 So. 2d 648 (1967).
82. The Louisiana statute disqualified claimants for "interest" in the dispute rather
than "direct interest." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1601(4) (West 1964). The distinction is
immaterial, however, because this comment treats the Washington court's analytical
approach to the determination of direct interest in terms of the distinction between "direct
interest" and "participation."
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[T]he Court of Appeals erred when it held that Senegal was not
"interested in" the labor dispute because he had no voice in the
dispute and no voice in the calling of the strike which caused
his unemployment. This narrow interpretation of the phrase
"interested in" actually has the effect of merging "interest" into
"participation." We consider that the Legislature intended for
"interested in" to have a meaning different from and broader
than "participating in"....s8
The court conceded that mere unemployment because of a labor
dispute did not create an interest in the dispute. It held, however,
that when the outcome of the dispute would affect their working
conditions in equal measure to its effect upon union members, the
claimants were "interested" in the dispute for purposes of dis-
qualification.
Senegal, representing the majority interpretation of direct
interest, stands in striking contrast to the Washington Supreme
Court's interpretation of the disqualification. The majority ap-
proach, resolving the issue in terms of the claimants' economic
interest in the outcome of the dispute, identifies more closely with
the legislative intent underlying the disqualification. By applying
relatively strict, impersonal standards for disqualification, the
majority approach recognizes and supports the principle that
labor dispute unemployment constitutes a general species of un-
employment outside the scope and purposes of unemployment
insurance. Because the very nature of the claimants' economic
interest in the dispute lends itself to simple, objective evaluation,
the court can conduct an uncomplicated, objective inquiry into
the claimants' status with respect to the labor dispute. The ap-
proach relieves the court of the necessity of arbitrating the merits
of each labor dispute in an effort to ascertain whether the unem-
ployment is the claimants' "fault." Similarly, the test's very sim-
plicity provides the local administrator of unemployment bene-
fits with an uncomplicated method for applying the direct inter-
est disqualification to future labor disputes.84 Finally, the major-
ity interpretation imparts an independent, efficacious meaning to
direct interest; it does not merge direct interest into participation
and thus render it mere surplusage.
In contrast, the Washington court's interpretation of direct
interest possesses none of the internal logic of the majority ap-
83. 250 La. 623, 631, 197 So. 2d 648, 650 (1967) (emphasis added).
84. Most decisions allocating benefits occur at the administrative level. Thus, the
courts must interpret the disqualification clearly and consistently to facilitate the admin-
istrative decision making process.
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proach. The court's entire approach to the labor dispute disquali-
fication indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the func-
tion of the disqualification, which acknowledges the realities of
the modern industrial management-labor relationship. Rather
than deal with claimants on the basis of their participation in a
powerful labor movement, the court has elected to isolate individ-
ual claimants, regarding them merely as innocent victims of in-
dustrial strife. In short, the court has allowed its sympathy for the
individual claimant to override its duty to interpret the disquali-
fication consistent with the disqualification's legislatively in-
tended function.
The practical inadequacy of the court's present interpreta-
tion leads to one conclusion: the court should broaden its inter-
pretation of the labor dispute disqualification. The initial step in
this direction requires judicial recognition of the disqualifica-
tion's legitimate function in unemployment insurance legislation.
The approach requires that the court treat labor dispute unem-
ployment as constituting a general species of unemployment out-
side the scope and purposes of unemployment insurance and af-
firmatively repudiate its present "fault based" analytical ap-
proach to the disqualification. Once the court adopts such an
objective approach to the consideration of the claimants' rela-
tionship to the labor dispute, it will realize the necessity of differ-
entiating the concepts of participation, direct interest, and grade
or class membership. To date, the court has only intimated its
dissatisfaction with its present interpretation of the labor dispute
disqualification. The court should now act upon this dissatisfac-
tion and expressly disavow any interpretation of the disqualifica-
tion formulated solely in terms of actual participation in the dis-
pute. The change is long overdue.
Steven Soha
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